Life is physics: evolution as a collective phenomenon far from
  equilibrium by Goldenfeld, Nigel & Woese, Carl
ar
X
iv
:1
01
1.
41
25
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
18
 N
ov
 20
10
Life is physics: evolution as a collective phenomenon far from equilibrium
Nigel Goldenfeld1 and Carl Woese1,2
1Department of Physics, Center for the Physics of Living Cells, and Institute for Genomic Biology,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1110 West Green St., Urbana, IL 61801, USA
2Department of Microbiology and Institute for Genomic Biology,
601 South Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
Evolution is the fundamental physical process that gives rise to biological phenomena. Yet it is
widely treated as a subset of population genetics, and thus its scope is artificially limited. As a
result, the key issues of how rapidly evolution occurs, and its coupling to ecology have not been
satisfactorily addressed and formulated. The lack of widespread appreciation for, and understanding
of, the evolutionary process has arguably retarded the development of biology as a science, with
disastrous consequences for its applications to medicine, ecology and the global environment. This
review focuses on evolution as a problem in non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, where the key
dynamical modes are collective, as evidenced by the plethora of mobile genetic elements whose role in
shaping evolution has been revealed by modern genomic surveys. We discuss how condensed matter
physics concepts might provide a useful perspective in evolutionary biology, the conceptual failings
of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the open-ended growth of complexity, and the quintessentially
self-referential nature of evolutionary dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the publication of the draft of the Hu-
man Genome[1], Stephen Jay Gould, the noted evolu-
tionary biologist, penned an extraordinary Op-Ed piece
in the New York Times. Although the occasion was in
some sense the apotheosis of the molecular biology revo-
lution, begun nearly 50 years earlier with the elucidation
of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick at the
Cavendish Laboratory, Gould’s tone was far from lauda-
tory. For, with the entire genome in hand, the genes
could be immediately counted, yielding an initial esti-
mate of between 30,000 and 40,000 genes, half as many
again as those in the genome of the tiny roundworm C.
elegans (we now know that the initial estimate was incor-
rect, and the correct number of genes is smaller, closer
to 21,000[2]). Gould commented:
“Homo sapiens possesses between 30,000 and 40,000
genes... In other words, our bodies develop under the
directing influence of only half again as many genes as
the tiny roundworm ....The collapse of the doctrine of
one gene for one protein, and one direction of causal
flow from basic codes to elaborate totality, marks the
failure of reductionism for the complex system that we
call biology ... The key to complexity is not more genes,
but more combinations and interactions generated by
fewer units of code and many of these interactions (as
emergent properties, to use the technical jargon) must
be explained at the level of their appearance, for they
cannot be predicted from the separate underlying parts
alone.”[3]
In other words, if we are to understand our biology, we
need a statistical mechanics of genes: the fundamental
processes that have shaped us are strongly collective in
nature, and need to be treated appropriately.
The complexities of the human genome are by no
means an isolated example of collective phenomena in bi-
ology. The majority of cellular life is microbial, and these
organisms also are strongly interacting. Microbes are
able to exchange genes (horizontal gene transfer)[4], com-
municate between cells (quorum sensing)[5], translocate
collectively over surfaces (swarming motility)[6, 7], and
form biofilms—spatially-extended multicellular colonies
with coordinated division of labor, cellular differentiation
and cooperative defense against antagonists[8].
Clearly, collective processes abound in biology, but
they have been relatively neglected by the biological
physics community; most of the biological research being
performed in physics departments today is an outgrowth
of the tremendous technological advances in molecular
biology, single-molecule biophysics and computational bi-
ology.
Also neglected, but with even less justification, is
the process of evolution itself; written off as a solved
problem under the catch-phrase “natural selection”, it
was relegated to a peripheral role during the develop-
ment of molecular biology[9]. With the growing recog-
nition of the importance of collective phenomena in
evolution especially[10–13], but also in ecology[14–18],
immunology[19, 20], microbiology[21–23] and even global
climate change[24–26], it is timely to assess the extent
to which a condensed matter physics perspective—with
its unifying principles of collective behavior arising from
interactions—can be illuminating in biology. Equally
fascinating is the notion that biology may extend the
frontier of non-equilibrium physics, revealing principles
of self-organization that seem absent in purely physical
processes such as pattern formation. Is the study of biol-
ogy merely an exercise in reverse-engineering a rich set of
extremely complicated chemical reactions, or are deeper
principles at work to bring molecules to life?
The purpose of this article is to discuss these questions
by providing a necessarily selective survey of evolution-
ary biology, highlighting the role of collective effects and
2thereby the possible connections with condensed matter
physics. Thus, no attempt is made here at a complete
review of evolution. Instead, we have tried to focus on
points of principle, where the shortcomings of present-
day understanding seem most acute to us. It would be
impossible to review the entire literature of evolution or
even the sub-set of this literature that is potentially en-
gaging for physicists. For a useful and self-contained in-
troduction to the conventional, eukaryote-centric frame-
work of evolutionary theory, accessible to physicists with
little biological background, we refer the reader to the
standard text by Maynard Smith[27]; an introduction
that also covers physics-related topics especially has been
given by Drossel[28]. Most of life is microbial, and a mod-
ern microbe-centric view of evolution can be found in the
book by Sapp[29].
We envisage a readership with a wide range of knowl-
edge and interest in evolutionary biology. To the biologist
interested in practical issues, we ask that you do not dis-
miss the seemingly useless and na¨ıve issues that we neces-
sarily raise. On the one hand, a fundamental understand-
ing of evolution may not seem to offer immediate benefits
in terms of finding the next wonder drug; on the other
hand, the lack of appreciation for the rapidity and per-
vasiveness of evolution has, within a lifetime, destroyed
the effectiveness of numerous antibiotics[30], and proba-
bly is responsible for the limited success of the treatment
of cancer[31]. The biomedical-industrial complex cannot
afford to ignore the need to create a fundamental science
of biology. To the physicist, who might be repelled by the
seeming lack of structure represented by biology, we ask
that you look beyond the currently incomplete state of
biological understanding, and be open to the possibility
that evolution is both a physical phenomenon and the
natural framework in which biology is embedded. The
lack of structure in the way that biology is traditionally
presented reflects the field’s unavoidable focus on a single
sample path; however, the underlying evolutionary pro-
cess itself is surely one with deep mathematical structure,
capable of expression and elucidation in unifying terms
based on emergent physical laws. This is a true frontier
of physics, but one that will require a great deal of what
has been termed (in another context of non-equilibrium
physics) “open-minded spadework”[32] to unearth.
EVOLUTION AS A PROBLEM IN CONDENSED
MATTER PHYSICS
Life is Chemistry
Most living organisms are composed of cells. Setting
aside, for the moment, the question of what constitutes
“life”, one might attempt to gain further insight into the
nature of life by examining carefully the contents of cells.
This enterprise culminated in the advent of molecular bi-
ology in the second half of the twentieth century, and it
is now firmly established that cells contain a multitude
of molecular components to perform the functions of life.
These include such examples as: phospholipid bilayers
to bound the cell; cytosol containing water and organic
molecules that form the fluid matrix of the cell; nucleic
acids to record genetic information; proteins comprised
of strings of amino acids that inter alia structure the cell,
pump molecules in and out of the cell, catalyze metabolic
processes, perform mechanical functions, participate in
the cell cycle, transcribe and translate genetic informa-
tion, and allow for signaling between cells; and small
molecules such as adenosine triphosphate that transport
energy within a cell. The study of life must proceed by
the study of the machinery within the cell, with addi-
tional consideration given to multi-cellular phenomena
where applicable. Moreover, any discussion of the ori-
gin of life from early geochemistry should focus on the
chemical environments from which life might have arisen,
and describe the biochemical pathways through which
metabolic and genetic information could arise sponta-
neously from such a milieu. Indeed, as van Helmont con-
cluded in 1648, and as is even today the rallying cry at
conferences on the origin and evolution of life, it seems
quite clear that “all life is chemistry”[33].
Or is it?
Life is Physics
From a condensed matter physicist’s perspective, we
have been led to a rather strange conclusion. To see
why this is the case, and why it is important to dwell
on this point, let us reflect on the modern way in which
many readers of Annual Reviews of Condensed Matter
Physics view their field. We will contrast that with
an explicitly reductionist perspective, one which typi-
fies most (but certainly not all) reasoning in biology. To
begin, suppose that we were to apply this “biological”
perspective to study the phenomenon of superconductiv-
ity. The first step might be the construction of a cat-
alogue of the known superconductors, a list that might
include elements such as Niobium or Tin, the cuprate ox-
ides such as La2−xSrxCuO4, the alkali-doped fullerenes
such as Cs2RbC60, and the heavy-fermion materials such
as URu2Si2. From consideration of the structure of the
electronic band structure of these materials, the biologist
might try to argue, quite reasonably, that the transfer of
electrons between outer atomic orbitals is somehow the
cause of the interesting transport, thermodynamic and
electrodynamic response of these materials. Even though
we would not be able to actually construct a predictive
theory of superconductivity, we might still conclude that
“all superconductivity is chemistry”. Although we have
referred to this hypothetical line of reasoning as a “bi-
ological perspective”, it was actually the approach tried
3originally by physicists, an approach that failed. In fact,
such a line of reasoning was attempted by A. Einstein
in 1922[34] (see also [35] for historical context) prior to
the development of quantum theory in its mature form.
From the manifest failure of his effort, Einstein concluded
(correctly) that not only was superconductivity of quan-
tum mechanical origin, but that it must involve elec-
trons transported between closed chains of orbitals, an
uncanny precursor of Feynman’s theory for macroscopic
quantum order in superfluid helium[36]. We learn from
all this that reductionism is a natural, intuitive step in
the construction of theory, and that its failure mode can
be an instructive pointer to the necessary ingredients of
a successful theory.
The fallacy of “superconductivity is chemistry” is more
evident than the fallacy in the logic leading to the con-
clusion that “life is chemistry”. We know now, starting
with the work of Ginzburg and Landau, that supercon-
ductivity has, in fact, little to do with the quantum chem-
istry of the atoms in the material. Instead, supercon-
ductivity is best understood as arising from the break-
ing of the global U(1) gauge symmetry in the effective
field theory that describes the interaction between off-
diagonal long-range order and the electromagnetic field.
Any microscopic Hamiltonian whose effective field theory
is Ginzburg-Landau theory will give rise to the phenom-
ena associated with superconductivity. There is noth-
ing fundamental about the atoms or molecules. Indeed,
our putative biologist would be astonished to learn of
color superconductivity in deconfined quark matter[37],
likely to be realized in the neutron star remnants of core-
collapse supernovae. Such high temperature supercon-
ductivity would be inconceivable from a narrow perspec-
tive based purely upon atomic chemistry; moreover, the
conceptual relationship between the astrophysical and
condensed matter versions of superconductivity would
appear obscure.
To summarize, the phenomenon of superconductivity
as a process is captured by the universal, symmetry-
based Ginzburg-Landau theory, but that process can
have many different realizations or instantiations from
matter at a variety of energy and length scales. This level
of understanding is one that crucially informs the modus
operandi of condensed matter physics. Typically, we re-
gard a phenomenon as essentially understood when two
conditions have been met. The first is that the reasons
for the very existence of the phenomenon are known, usu-
ally from some form of symmetry or topological consid-
eration. The second is that we have a way to determine
under what circumstances a particular system (atomic,
molecular, nuclear, etc.) represents an instantiation or
realization of the phenomenon. Thus, the mantra of con-
densed matter physics, sometimes attributed to Murray
Gell-Mann but surely anticipated in spirit by Lev Lan-
dau, becomes a recipe for discovery: “That which is not
forbidden is mandatory”. By this is meant that any al-
lowable process can occur, and therefore it behooves one
to try and identify the universality classes (i.e. cate-
gories) of interesting phenomena, and then to try and
identify the likely realizations of them. This pattern of
discovery is a relatively recent one, arising during the
emergence and maturation of condensed matter physics
as a scientific discipline during the last 25 years of the
twentieth century, and exemplified, for example, by the
new and important condensed matter sub-field of topo-
logical insulators, where the theoretical understanding
led to a concerted and successful search for experimental
realizations. This example is by no means an isolated
one: other examples of major significance include the
Aharonov-Bohm effect, the quantum spin hall effect, lo-
calization, and the renaissance in atomic, molecular and
optical physics provided by the experimental realization
of atomic Bose-Einstein condensates.
The Need for a Physics of Living Systems
The point of this lengthy discourse should now be
clear. It is as limiting to view life as chemistry as it is
to view condensed matter collective states as being pri-
marily about the atoms. The physics of living systems
would have at its core a generalized description of evo-
lutionary processes, reflecting allowable dynamical sym-
metries, not merely static configurational ones. Such a
description would, in a very crude sense, be a counterpart
to the description of emergent states of matter embod-
ied by effective theories such as the Ginzburg-Landau
theory alluded to above. A genuine physics of living sys-
tems would encompass different limits of the evolutionary
process, each recognized as, and described by different ef-
fective theories.
A biological example of a universality class and the cor-
responding effective theory is classical population genet-
ics, itself sub-divided into two universality classes, one for
sexual organisms and one for asexual organisms. Taken
at face value, population genetics contains phenomeno-
logical parameters, such as effective population size, fit-
ness and growth rate, and attempts to model generic
aspects of populations and their genes. It certainly is
not a microscopic theory, because it lacks a biochemical
level of description, and it is certainly an effective theory,
valid only when there is a separation of scales between
ecosystem dynamics and gene mutation dynamics. Con-
densed matter physics was liberated from the hegemony
of Fermi liquid theory by the recognition that there are
many other universality classes describing the behavior
of electrons in solids, representing different types of col-
lective behavior and interactions between (e.g.) spin and
charge degrees of freedom. Similarly, we anticipate that
evolutionary biology can be liberated from the hegemony
of classical population genetics through the recognition
that other universality classes must exist, and will be
4manifest under the appropriate conditions. We will say
more below about the ways we see that the discoveries of
modern biology are positioning it to take the next step
beyond the paradigm of classical population genetics.
This perspective redefines what we demand of biologi-
cal understanding in two additional ways. First, the very
existence of the phenomenon of life needs to be under-
stood. Second, the realization or instantiation of it, on
Earth, for example, needs to be understood. For the most
part, it is fair to say that the discipline of biology has ne-
glected the first condition, and in pursuit of the second,
has confused understanding of the realization with un-
derstanding of the phenomenon. This has had a number
of unfortunate consequences, which arguably have hin-
dered both the conceptual development of biology and
the proper application of foundational understanding to
societal applications.
Let’s begin with the conceptual difficulties. A unified
view of a phenomenon, such as we have alluded to in
superconductivity, has the benefit that further instances
of it do not come as a surprise, and do not require fur-
ther ad hoc explanation. With a proper understanding
of superconductivity as a symmetry-breaking process, for
example, one does not find it surprising to learn of super-
conductivity in nuclear or astrophysical contexts. With a
proper understanding of the phenomenon of life as a dy-
namical process, for example, one would not find it sur-
prising to learn of life in so-called extreme environments
(such as deep beneath the ocean floor) or even on other
planets. Amongst the surprises that biology has encoun-
tered recently are several of major significance, including:
the discovery of horizontal gene transfer in multicellular
eukaryotes[38–42] and the discovery of a fully anoxic mul-
ticellular life form[43]. In short, a unified view prevents
the unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses that is the
sure sign of a lack of fundamental understanding (think
epicycles!).
The second consequence of a lack of fundamental un-
derstanding in biology is the failure to recognize that
biology is a manifestation of evolution — not the other
way round. Interventions in biological systems inevitably
provoke an evolutionary response which is rapidly emerg-
ing and spatially-distributed. Examples of the ability
of biological systems to defeat human attempts at mit-
igation include: (1) the world-wide spread of antibi-
otic resistance genes across distantly-related bacteria,
crossing species and phylum boundaries and physical
locations[30]; (2) the rapid evolution of cancer tumors
in the face of chemical attack[31, 44, 45]; (3) the abil-
ity of HIV to out-adapt treatment[46, 47]; (4) the ability
of life to adapt to the massive poisoning of the Precam-
brian atmosphere by cyanobacteria-released oxygen 2.4
billion years ago (changing from a reducing to an oxidiz-
ing atmosphere[48]) with a remarkable subsequent flow-
ering of life. With the exception of example (4), these
examples indicate a fundamental limitation to medical
science, akin to trying to design integrated circuits with-
out a fundamental knowledge of quantum electronics and
semiconductor physics.
Perhaps the primary shortcoming of the biological en-
terprise is the manifest failure to account for the phe-
nomenon of the existence of life. Without doubt, this
failure reflects not only on biologists, but also on physi-
cists. We say this because the majority of biologists
would probably regard their primary role as being in one
sense or another to reverse engineer the myriad specific
realizations of organic life on Earth — the reductionist
exercise that has been notably successful within its own
terms of reference. On the other hand, the existence of
the phenomenon of life, if it can be understood at all in
generic terms, is surely an emergent phenomenon, arising
somehow as an inevitable consequence of the laws of non-
equilibrium statistical physics. How is it that matter self-
organizes into hierarchies that are capable of generating
feedback loops which connect multiple levels of organi-
zation and are evolvable? When life emerged from early
geochemistry the process must have been driven by irre-
versible thermodynamics, but the extension of that pro-
cess into the emergence of evolvable structures remains
mysterious to us. The physical laws that govern far from
equilibrium dynamics are still not known.
Are there new physical laws in Biology?
In 1949, Delbru¨ck, inspired by Bohr, famously ex-
pressed the view that biology might exhibit phenomena
that are beyond quantum mechanics:
“Just as we find features of the atom, its stability, for
instance, which are not reducible to mechanics, we may
find features of the living cell which are not reducible
to atomic physics, but whose appearance stands in a
complementary relationship to those of atomic physics.”
— M. Delbru¨ck, A Physicist Looks at Biology (1949).
[49]
Today, few seriously expect that such features or phys-
ical laws will be found. However, in the same essay, in a
less-celebrated passage, Delbru¨ck drew attention to the
problem of spontaneous generation of life. Surprisingly,
to him the interesting issue was how statistical fluctua-
tions in the kinetics of the emergence of life would lead to
a possible lack of determinacy in the biochemistry of liv-
ing organisms: the organism might not precisely reflect
the geochemistry from which it arose. Delbru¨ck was writ-
ing at a time when phase transitions were only beginning
to be understood, and the notions of emergence and spon-
taneous symmetry breaking were in their infancy. Thus,
he probably had no precise notion of a “law” of physics
being a description of an effective theory, one that is valid
on an intermediate asymptotic scale of length, time or
energy, and systematically related to a deeper level of
description. Whereas Delbru¨ck looked to biology to ex-
5tend quantum mechanics, we look to it as a source of
insight into non-equilibrium statistical mechanics of the
evolutionary process.
Thus, the study of biology should be more than simply
cataloguing the wonders of biological organization. We
see no reason why the mantra attributed to Gell-Mann
should not apply with equal force and predictive power
in biology, and become part of its methodology. Today
a condensed matter physicist envisages a new class of
collective processes and finds realizations in the world
of materials, or for that matter, optical lattices. What
would biology look like as a science if we sought to antic-
ipate the types of evolutionary processes available to the
suite of genetic operators now known? What realizations
of such processes could we find, if we simply looked?
Maybe this sounds far-fetched, but in fact this method-
ology has already been used to good effect in biology.
One example we have in mind is the groundbreaking dis-
covery of the class of molecules known as topoisomerases,
whose existence was first recognized theoretically, leading
to their eventual discovery[50, 51]. The topoisomerases
are a class of enzymes that are able to perform the mir-
acle of passing one strand of DNA through another, by
breaking and then reforming them. The end result of this
process is that DNA can be uncoiled through a process
of successive topological changes, allowing transcription
and replication to occur. Without the topoisomerases,
this would be essentially impossible on the timescale rel-
evant to cellular processes.
BEYOND THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
The classical and widely-accepted framework of evo-
lution is the so-called “Modern Synthesis” or “Neo-
Darwinism”, based on the fusion of Mendelian genetics
with Wallace[52] and Darwin’s ideas[53] about “natural
selection” (or “survival of the fittest”, the terminology
preferred by Wallace)[27, 54]. This theory and addi-
tions to it, primarily those due to Kimura[55], account
for very simple genetic processes, such as point muta-
tion and sexual recombination, leading to random single
nucleotide polymorphisms. A characteristic of these clas-
sical theories of evolution is that their genome dynamics
is linear, diffusive in nature, and the population sizes of
communities are typically sufficiently large that fixation
times are long. This union of evolution and genetics that
developed in the 1930’s and 1940’s presumed that evo-
lution proceeded through the simple mechanism of her-
itable mutation and survival of the fittest. Organisms
have offspring that survive and propagate based on the
quality of the inevitably mutated genome they inherited
from their parents (vertical gene transfer). New positive
traits spread through the population because the individ-
uals with those traits were more successful in surviving
and breeding than other members of the population. A
variety of possible niches in the physical environment en-
able the multiplication of species, which then interact to
create new niches. Thus, in this picture, evolution is es-
sentially synonymous with population genetics. Genes
are assumed to be the only dynamical variables that are
tracked, and are associated with a fitness benefit that
is difficult to define or measure precisely, but is quanti-
fied by a fitness landscape that describes how the pop-
ulation fitness depends on the genotype[56–59]. Traits
are simply associated with genes, and gene interactions
are often ignored, or at best handled through the fitness
landscape[59, 60].
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the
evolutionary time-scale is different from the time-scale
of the ecosystem. The crucial question of the timescale
of the evolutionary process, even taking at face value the
perspective of the modern synthesis (which we do not) re-
mains a thorny issue[61], and indeed it is fair to say that
the theory’s conceptual framework is so poorly quantified
that one cannot confidently make sensible and realistic
estimates of timescales (for an excellent pedagogical dis-
cussion of this point, see [62]).
Epistasis
Even within the framework of the Modern Synthesis,
one can begin to make model calculations of how evo-
lution rates vary with population size and the nature of
the fitness landscape[59, 63–66], and probe the role of
collective effects—epistasis—between genes. For exam-
ple, phenotypic variance is generally thought to be the
result of many-gene interactions[67], as documented in a
tour de force analysis of the yeast metabolic network, for
example[68]. In yeast, a single-cell eukaryote, any posi-
tive selection that accrues from many interacting genes
with small but positive contributions to fitness must con-
tend with recombination that mixes up and randomizes
the genotype. This competition can lead to collective
states, more or less by analogy to phase transitions: a
high recombination rate (analogous to high temperature)
where genes are weakly correlated and genotypes are
short-lived, and a low recombination rate (analogous to
low temperature) regime where favorable genotypes are
stable and compete essentially clonally[60]. In bacteria,
which reproduce clonally, recombination is a stabilizing
factor and can compete in a similar way with point mu-
tations, leading to two phases: one that contains a nar-
row distribution of genotypes and one that is genomically
diverse, with global genome sequence divergence arising
through the propagation along the genome in evolution-
ary time of diversification fronts triggered by horizontal
gene transfer events[69], or perhaps even by indels[70].
How these dynamics play out when the spatial struc-
ture of microbial populations is included is a fascinating
question, bringing together genome dynamics, ecosystem
6dynamics and population dynamics in a way that has not
yet been explored.
Mobile genetic elements
The difficulties in making detailed and quantitative
theories of the rate of evolution become vastly more
acute as a result of discoveries from the emerging sci-
ence of genomics[13]. Building on the seminal work of
Barbara McClintock[71], the past decade or so has wit-
nessed the discovery of a plethora of what one might term
“classically-forbidden” processes that radically trans-
form our understanding of dynamics at the level of the
genome[72]. Of particular importance is the discovery
of mobile genetic elements in many forms, ranging from
transposons to horizontal gene transfer agents[4, 73–78],
whose levels of activity and evolutionary impact have al-
most surely been severely underestimated[79]. Horizontal
transfer means that genes or other genetic materials are
transmitted through a variety of non-hereditary mecha-
nisms from one organism to another, and subsequently
expressed, thus altering the behavior (phenotype) of the
recipient. Long known to be present in Bacteria and
Archaea, horizontal gene transfer is now known to be
present in multicellular Eukaryotes as well, as a result of
genome-wide surveys published in the last year or so[38–
42, 80]. While the horizontal transfer of genes is widely
recognized to be a major evolutionary force in Archaea
and Bacteria, it is still too early to be precise about its
role in Eukaryotes.
However, it is not only genes that can be transferred:
in Eukaryotes, genes are a small fraction of the total
genome, with non-coding DNA and transposable ele-
ments making up the majority of the genome in some
cases. Transposable elements, sometimes inaccurately
but colorfully known as “jumping genes”, can easily move
around and between chromosomes, and through the dis-
ruption that they potentially inflict upon a genome, cause
deleterious mutations and illness. In humans, it is esti-
mated that about 45% of the genome is composed of
transposable elements[1]. Horizontal transfer of trans-
posable elements can be a major driver of eukaryotic
genome evolution and a source of genetic innovation[81–
83]. Indeed, the textbook picture of a static genome
composed of genes and junk DNA has now been super-
seded by recent findings, and it is arguably more appro-
priate to think of the genome as a set of one-dimensional
ecosystems, coupled together by horizontal transfer, and
containing numerous genetic elements interacting with
each other, creating niches for themselves, and evolving
stochastically to create a community ecology[84].
These genetic mechanisms permit the spread of genetic
novelty much faster than vertical or hereditary transmis-
sion of genes, essentially amounting to a Lamarckian[85]
dynamic of evolution[12, 86]. If this was not enough, it
is now incontrovertible that the inheritance of acquired
characteristics, long discredited, but violating no known
law of nature, can sometimes occur, not only through
horizontal gene transfer (e.g. in microbes), but through
so-called epigenetic mechanisms that by-pass the usual
modes of inheritance[87, 88] (especially in ciliates[89]).
Not only is the Modern Synthesis afflicted by strong
interactions, but its very foundation is questionable. The
evident tautology embodied by “survival of the fittest”
serves to highlight the backwards-looking character of the
fitness landscape: not only is it unmeasurable a priori,
but it carries with it no means of expressing the growth of
open-ended complexity[90] and the generation of genetic
novelty. Thus, the Modern Synthesis is, at best, a partial
representation of population genetics, but this on its own
is a limited subset of the evolutionary process itself, and
arguably the least interesting one.
Coupling between evolution and ecology
It is not only the microscopic basis for current evo-
lutionary theory that has been challenged by recent ad-
vances in biology. There is now a substantial and grow-
ing literature that documents a surprisingly rapid rate
of evolution in numerous systems[91–98], ranging from
cancer tumors and the immune system to ecosystem-
driven adaptations in all three domains of life. More-
over, detailed observations document the coupling be-
tween evolutionary and ecological timescales[92, 99–105].
In a predator-prey system realized in rotifer-algae inter-
actions, the rapid evolutionary dynamics is responsible
for the unusual phase-lag characteristics of the observed
population oscillations[106].
Evolutionary and ecological timescales can also become
coupled if the ecological timescale becomes very long:
an important example of this is provided by the ecol-
ogy of the translation apparatus in the cell. The ge-
netic code—the map between triplet codons and amino
acids is degenerate: there can be several synonomous
codons that code for the same amino acid. It is well-
established that the synonomous codons are not used
with equal frequency, and this codon usage bias reflects
selection for speed or accuracy of translation of highly-
expressed genes[107, 108]. The translation process is a
highly-complex one, but relies essentially on the avail-
ability of resources, in particular tRNA molecules. Evo-
lution of the genome can of course also lead to a co-
evolution of the abundance of tRNA in the cell, leading
to a nonlinear dynamics of the genome and its tRNA
abundance distribution[109]. By going beyond the clas-
sical mutation-drift-selection framework into the regime
of nonlinear evolutionary dynamics, the theory predicts
multi-stability of the genome and an explanation of the
pattern of observed microbial genome biases, not only in
translation, but also in transcription and replication.
7The coupling between environmental and ecological
timescales has also been argued to lead to another generic
feature of biology: the prevalence of modularity[110–
113]. Modularity refers to the relative independence of a
biological component or network—relative, because ev-
erything is connected, of course, but the intramodule
connections are more important than intermodule con-
nections. Modularity carries with it the connotation of
reuse of motifs, simple building blocks from which com-
plex systems can be built[110]. One might think that
such networks could be generically obtained from sim-
ulations of the evolutionary process, for example using
genetic algorithms and digital life simulations[114], but
remarkably this is not the case[112]. The reason is that
typically such simulations emulate the assumed process
of “natural selection”: networks are evolved by muta-
tions, recombination and other genetic operators, and
only those which perform a defined goal well enough
are permitted to enter the next generation. The key
to modularity seems to be the coupling to the environ-
ment, as evidenced by two rather different calculations.
In the first, the network was evolved in an environment of
goals that changed in a modular fashion[112]; moreover,
a follow-up study[113] showed clearly that environmen-
tal fluctuations do indeed accelerate the rate of evolu-
tion. In the second study[115, 116], modularity emerged
spontaneously as an outcome of horizontal gene trans-
fer in the presence of environmental fluctuations. This
result, admittedly obtained in a rather specific model,
nevertheless highlights the importance of collective inter-
actions and the interplay between environmental fluctu-
ations and evolution, neglected in the modern synthesis.
How does horizontal gene transfer influence the ar-
chitecture of actual biological networks? Comparative
genomics, coupled with the flux balance analysis of the
metabolic network of E. coli has demonstrated that the
network grows by acquiring genes individually and in
groups (typically operons governing coupled reactions),
which are attached preferentially at the edges of the ex-
isting network[117]. This form of network organization
does not necessarily imply modularity, but it suggests
one way that modularity can arise. Although there is
no unique measure of modularity, the available analyses
indicate that modularity is an increasing function of the
variability of the environment[118] and that modularity
also reflects the number of niches available and is associ-
ated with horizontal gene transfer[119].
An example of the non-trivial coupling between evo-
lution and ecology has been obtained by recent metage-
nomic surveys of marine microbial environments, sam-
pling and analysing environmental DNA collected from
the Sargasso Sea and the Red Sea. Thirty percent
of global carbon fixation occurs through the photosyn-
thetic pathways of two cyanobacteria, Prochlorococcus
and Synechococcus. Remarkably, the phages of these
organisms also contain photosystem II genes, presum-
ably to maintain the host as a functioning phage factory,
thereby increasing the production of phages during the
lysis process as the host cell is destroyed. From analysing
the molecular sequences of these genes, and reconstruct-
ing their evolutionary history, Chisholm’s group at MIT
have documented the transfer of photosystem II genes
back and forth between these marine cyanobacteria and
their phages[120]. Moreover, these genes underwent evo-
lution and sequence shuffling while resident in the phages.
Thus, rather than supporting the traditional view of
the relationship between microbes and viruses as being
a predator-prey relationship, the new findings suggest
that there are collective interactions between microbes
and viruses through gene exchange, with the creation
of an effective global reservoir of genetic diversity that
profoundly influences the dynamics of the major marine
ecosystems. These findings had been anticipated many
years earlier by numerous investigators[73, 75, 121–123],
who appreciated and rediscovered the collective outcome
of horizontal gene transfer.
During the last few years, an even more astonishing
example has come to light, prompted in part by the at-
tempt to find the cause of colony collapse disorder—the
dramatic reduction in honey bee population (in the US,
losses of adult workers were 23% during 2006-7, 36% dur-
ing 2007-8)[124]. One of the potential pathogenic causes,
the Israeli acute paralysis virus (IAPV), was found to
be able to integrate harmlessly its genome into that of
the bee host, and thus confer immunity on the host
to further infection. The surprise is that this virus is
not a retro-virus: it does not need to integrate itself
into the host genome in order to replicate, and so it
lacks the genetic machinery for reverse transcription of
its RNA into the host DNA. It is not currently known,
therefore, how IAPV was able to work its way into
the host genome. This is not an isolated example: it
is now known that a similar process has occurred in
at least 19 vertebrate species, the relevant viruses that
have conferred immunity being the lethal Bornavirus and
Ebolavirus[125, 126]. It seems that this mechanism is a
eukaryotic analogue to lysogeny in microbes. These find-
ings support the notion that there are collective interac-
tions between viruses and their hosts.
Evolution and ecology couple not only through time,
but also through space. Wallace was the first to empha-
size that speciation is a phenomenon localized in both
space and time[127]: evolution proceeds through a pro-
cess of front propagation in space that couples to pop-
ulation genetics in ways that are conceptually simple
but only now beginning to be understood in a quan-
titative way[128–131]. As fronts expand, the pioneer
organisms at the leading edge experience large demo-
graphic fluctuations that are known to play a significant
role in temporal oscillations[132] and spatial patterns in
ecosystems[133]. It is important to stress that horizontal
gene transfer is also strongly influenced by spatial struc-
8ture. For example, it was recently established that the
frequency of conjugation events between bacteria is de-
pendent on the local density, being essentially one/per
generation in closely-packed biofilms, and an order of
magnitude smaller in planktonic culture[77]. How the
interplay between evolutionary dynamics, ecosystem dy-
namics and species distribution is reflected in patterns of
species abundance distributions, diversity measures, and
community structure is a frontier topic in ecology, and
relevant to the emerging conceptual framework of niche
construction[134, 135].
THE DYNAMICS OF EVOLUTION
Most existing approaches to formulating evolutionary
dynamics mathematically, as Drossel explicitly points
out[28], share the limitation that the space in which evo-
lution takes place is fixed. For example, some models
consider the dynamics of genomes of fixed length in a
specified fitness landscape, others consider the interplay
between agents who are using specified strategies of be-
havior in their repeated encounters with other agents.
Such approaches to evolution miss what is to us the
central aspect of evolution: it is a process that contin-
ually expands the space in which it operates through a
dynamic that is essentially self-referential. Self-reference
should be an integral part of a proper understanding of
evolution, but it is rarely considered explicitly. This
point is so important, because it is at the root of why
evolution represents a non-trivial extension of the sorts
of dynamical processes we encounter in condensed mat-
ter physics. In condensed matter physics, there is a clear
separation between the rules that govern the time evo-
lution of the system and the state of the system itself.
For example, in studying fluid dynamics, a firm basis for
theory is provided by the Navier-Stokes equations, and
regardless of whether the flow is at low Reynolds num-
ber, dominated by viscous effects, or at high Reynolds
number and dominated by inertial effects, the underly-
ing equations are capable of capturing all the phenomena.
The mathematical reason for this is that the governing
equation does not depend on the solution of the equation.
The evolution operator is independent of the state of the
system. In biology, however, the situation is different.
The rules that govern the time evolution of the system
are encoded in abstractions, the most obvious of which
is the genome itself. As the system evolves in time, the
genome itself can be altered, and so the governing rules
are themselves changed. From a computer science per-
spective, one might say that the physical world can be
thought of as being modeled by two distinct components:
the program and the data. But in the biological world,
the program is the data, and vice versa. For example,
the genome encodes the information which governs the
response of an organism to its physical and biological
environment. At the same time, this environment ac-
tually shapes genomes, through gene transfer processes
and phenotype selection. Thus, we encounter a situation
where the dynamics must be self-referential: the update
rules change during the time evolution of the system, and
the way in which they change is a function of the state
and thus the history of the system. To a physicist, this
sounds strange and mysterious: What is the origin of this
feature that sets biological systems apart from physical
ones? Aren’t biological systems ultimately physical ones
anyway, so why is self-reference an exclusive feature of
biological systems (whatever they are!)?
The simple answer seems to be that self-reference arises
because the biological components of interest are emer-
gent, and we are seeking a description of biological phe-
nomena in terms of these biological components only. Ul-
timately, if we used a level of description that was purely
atomistic, for example, this self-referential aspect of biol-
ogy would not arise. This argument does not distinguish
biology from condensed matter physics, where many of
the degrees of freedom are emergent also.
Thus, it is interesting to ask if there are analogues of
this phenomenon in condensed matter physics, generi-
cally arising from coarse-grained description of systems
with order parameter dynamics. To answer this question,
recall, for example, the two types of description that we
have of superconductivity. On one hand there is the BCS
theory of superconductivity, which works at the level of
description of fermions coupled through a pairing interac-
tion (whose microscopic origin need not be specified, but
is due to phonons in classic superconductors and perhaps
spin or other interactions in high temperature supercon-
ductors). On the other hand, there is the coarse-grained
order parameter description due to Ginzburg and Lan-
dau. Frequently, physicists use the latter as a convenient
model that is easy to calculate with, in systems of ar-
bitrary geometry or with spatial variation. Moreover,
this level of description is frequently used to study the
time-dependent phenomena in superconductors, given by
the time-dependent Ginzburg-Landau equations. Near
the superconducting critical point, this description is a
generic consequence of critical dynamics. However, away
from the critical region this equation cannot be systemat-
ically derived. Similarly, in superfluids and Bose-Einstein
condensates, the zero temperature dynamics can be well-
described by the Gross-Pitaevskii equations, and near the
critical point, a more complicated dynamic universality
class is believed to be appropriate. Away from these two
regimes, however, there is no universally-agreed upon de-
scription that is systematically accurate. The reason that
there is confusion surrounding the dynamics at interme-
diate temperatures has in fact been well-understood, but
not widely appreciated, for many years: the assumption
that there exists a description local in both space and
time is false. This can be seen from the derivation of
the Ginzburg-Landau description from the more micro-
9scopic BCS theory, which in general involves a memory
function that becomes local in space and time only in
special limits. The breakdown of locality that accom-
panies effective descriptions of dynamical phenomena is
well-known beyond superconductivity, of course, and is
a feature of several approaches to non-equilibrium sta-
tistical mechanics, including mode-coupling theory and
renormalization group approaches to effective actions in
field theory.
Why self-reference is a specific feature of biological
systems and not physical systems should now be evi-
dent: self-referential dynamics is an inherent and prob-
ably defining feature of evolutionary dynamics and thus
biological systems. Thus, the question really is how self-
referential dynamics arises as a universality class from
the basic laws of microscopic physics, as an expression
of nonequilibrium physics. Although there is a recogni-
tion of this sort of question in some of the literature on
philosophy, artificial life and the evolution of language,
nothing approaching a serious calculation has been done
to our knowledge.
The fact that evolution is a process that transcends its
realization means that evolution is able to act on its own
basic mechanisms. This nonlinearity of the evolutionary
process is sometimes referred to as evolvability. It has im-
portant generic ramifications that have been explored in
a model calculation of protein evolution[115], in particu-
lar that evolvability is preferentially selected during peri-
ods of increased rate of environmental change. Whether
or not evolvability can be selected for, in the conven-
tional parlance, is a controversial topic, partly because of
the unfashionable nonlinearity of the process, and partly
because evolvability seems to undermine the robustness
of biological organization. Presumably, a detailed quan-
titative understanding of evolution would flesh out the
balance between evolvability and robustness[136].
Evolution and Complexity
Complex systems are characterized by the presence
of strong fluctuations, unpredictable and nonlinear dy-
namics, multiple scales of space and time, and frequently
some form of emergent structure. The individual compo-
nents of complex systems are so tightly coupled that they
cannot usefully be analyzed in isolation, rendering irrel-
evant traditional reductionist approaches to science, ob-
scuring causal relationships, and distinguishing complex-
ity from mere complication. Biological complexity, is an
extreme example of complexity, and arises from the inclu-
sion of active components, nested feedback loops, compo-
nent multifunctionality, and multiple layers of system dy-
namics, and is relevant to numerous aspects of the biolog-
ical, medical and earth sciences, including the dynamics
of ecosystems, societal interactions, and the functioning
of organisms. Perhaps the most striking features of biol-
ogy are the open-ended growth of complexity that we see
in the biosphere, the large population fluctuations, and
the widespread occurrence of the “law of unintended con-
sequences” when trying to manipulate ecosystems[137].
Thus, although complexity is hard to define precisely and
usefully, we regard the defining characteristic of complex-
ity as the breakdown of causality[138]. Simply put, com-
plex systems are ones for which observed effects do not
have uniquely definable causes, due to the huge nature
of the phase space and the multiplicity of paths.
Ecosystems are never static but are continually chang-
ing and adapting, and their response involves all levels
down to the genome and even smaller (because viruses
are an integral part of an ecosystem). In an attempt to
capture such complex dynamics, researchers have made
extensive use of digital life simulations.
Digital life simulations[28, 114, 139–144] use inter-
acting synthetic organisms, with predefined rules for
replication, evolution and interaction with each other
and their digital environment. Experiments on digital
organisms are an accurate and informative methodol-
ogy for understanding the process of evolution because
the entire phylogenetic history of a population can be
tracked, something that is much more difficult—but not
impossible[145]—to do with natural organisms[146]. Ex-
periments on digital organisms can be performed over
time scales relevant for evolution, and can capture uni-
versal aspects of evolutionary processes, including those
relevant to long-term adaptation [147, 148], ecological
specialization[149, 150] and the evolution of complex
traits[151]. Despite this progress, the way in which evo-
lution leads to ever increasing complexity of organisms
remains poorly understood and difficult to capture in
simulations and models to date. Is this because these
calculations are not sufficiently realistic, extensive, or de-
tailed, or has something fundamental been left out?
As early as 1971, Woese speculated on the emergence
of genetic organization[152]. He was concerned with the
evolution of complexity, but approached from a molec-
ular viewpoint, namely that of the origin of quaternary
structure in proteins. Woese portrayed evolution as a
cyclic process, in which gene products evolved first to a
dimerized state, followed by gene duplication, and sep-
arate evolution of the gene products so that the dimer
finally consists of related but not identical sub-units. If
the two genes that code for the two distinct halves of the
dimer subsequently fuse, a new composite molecule has
arisen that he called a “co-dimer”. In this co-dimer, the
two previously-related components can evolve separately
but in a complementary fashion, as long as the biochemi-
cal properties of the co-dimer as a whole are not adversely
affected. In this way, one half of the co-dimer could, for
example, evolve into a control site for the enzyme that is
the other member of the co-dimer. The point of this ar-
gument is that it provides a molecular realization of the
process of how evolution can cross wide fitness valleys[66].
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He argued that the dynamics of co-dimerization, repeated
ad infinitum, led to the growth of complexity of all macro-
molecular components of the cell, including proteins and
the translational machinery itself. If codimerization were
an important part of the evolutionary process, it would
perforce entail there being a high abundance of homod-
imeric proteins in the cell, and moreover that the num-
ber of subunits would be an even number. At the time
Woese’s paper appeared, the paucity of available data
did not permit a test of these predictions. Early pro-
tein structures were limited to small molecules because
of the difficulty of crystallizing larger molecules, so that
when the Protein Data Bank was surveyed in 1995, 66%
were found to be monomeric[153]. By 2000, the situa-
tion had dramatically changed, with 19% of the proteins
surveyed being monomeric. Of the remainder, 59% were
either dimers or tetramers, with a clear preference for
even numbers of sub-units[154, 155]. More recent anal-
yses confirm these findings and are even able to probe
the evolutionary dynamics that has led to the observed
structure of protein complexes[156]. Moreover, not only
has the detailed structural evidence consistent with the
co-dimerization model been fully elaborated, but also it
appears that the assembly of proteins follows the evolu-
tionary development of their sub-unit structure[157].
Co-dimerization and gene duplication are examples of
how biological systems exploit redundancy as one of the
prime mechanisms for evolution. This insight re-emerges
in recent simple models of evolutionary dynamics, which
show that open-ended complexity is only possible as
an outcome of complexity-scale-invariant genomic oper-
ators, such as gene duplication[90]. That is, if there are
genetic operators that bias organisms to have a specific
complexity, then the complexity of the system will not
increase without bound. This invariance is similar in
spirit to that which lies at the heart of the Richardson
cascade in turbulence[158, 159]. Guttenberg and Gold-
enfeld showed in an explicit model of digital life[90] how
different genetic operations behaved with regard to this
invariance criterion, and thus were able to devise ecosys-
tem models that evolved open-ended complexity. Despite
its popularity, a static “fitness landscape” [56–58] picture
of evolution does not satisfy the proposed invariance cri-
terion, and is indeed conceptually insufficient to account
for the open-ended growth of complexity. Thus, digital
life simulations do not generally evolve qualitatively new
responses or modes of behaviour; they cannot “think out-
side the box”.
The emphasis on redundancy as a motif suggests that
a component of evolution is multifunctionalism. To see
why, consider how a system is modeled, perhaps as a set
of differential equations or lattice update rules. These
rules themselves need to evolve: but how? We need
an additional set of rules describing the evolution of the
original rules. But this upper level of rules itself needs
to evolve. And so we end up with an infinite hierar-
chy, an inevitable reflection of the fact that the dynamic
we are seeking is inherently self-referential. The way
that the conundrum can be resolved is to begin with
an infinite-dimensional dynamical system which sponta-
neously undergoes a sequence of symmetry-breaking or
bifurcation events into lower-dimensional systems. Such
transitions can be thought of as abstraction events: suc-
cessive lower dimensional systems contain a representa-
tion in them of upper levels of the original system. A
precise mathematical prototype of such a construction
can be constructed from consideration of the dynamics
of functions on a closed one-dimensional interval[160], ad-
mittedly with very little direct biological interpretation,
but with the positive outcome of generating a hierarchi-
cally entangled dynamical network. Such networks are
not simple tree structures, and this means that the nodes
and links of the network drive each other in a way that
a biologist would interpret as co-evolutionary. Another
way to interpret such dynamical systems is that the el-
ements are multifunctional: their input-output map de-
pends on the state of the system, rather than being a con-
stant in time. Such systems can have no static fixed point
to their dynamics: in the language of earlier work[90],
they must exhibit a complexity cascade, just as Woese
had earlier argued in the context of co-dimerization.
Coevolution and game theory
An alternative to treating organisms as evolv-
ing in a fixed environment or fitness landscape is
coevolution[161]. In coevolution, organisms interact and
their interactions drive each to evolve, leading to a con-
tinuing process of phenotype evolution, although not nec-
essarily an increase in complexity, as occurs in the com-
plexity cascade[90]. Examples include mutualism and an-
tagonistic coevolution. In mutualism, the interaction is
basically symbiotic, and frequently occurs between plants
and animals[162], microbes and plants[163] and, gaining
increasing attention in the last few years, humans and
their microbiomes[164]). Antagonistic coevolution de-
scribes how opposing organisms, such as predators and
prey, develop an arms race[165, 166] as a result of their
competition, an effect generally referred to as the Red
Queen effect[165].
There is a growing empirical literature[167–173] on the
way in which antagonistic coevolution can accelerate evo-
lution and dominate a systems’s response to changing en-
vironmental conditions. However, this topic has received
much less theoretical attention to date. To investigate
the interaction of genomic evolution and population dy-
namics, we require that the matrix describing the inter-
actions between predator and prey evolve with genomic
fitness[174, 175]. In these approaches, the interaction ma-
trix is a linear function of either the fitness of the preda-
tors or the relative fitness of a pair, which is appropriate
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to describe the stabilization of complex foodwebs with a
large number of species, but probably not adequate to
describe systems with a Red Queen dynamics, where the
genomic fitness is a distribution for a species instead of
a single number. In this case, the evolution of the inter-
action matrix is nonlinear, and the dynamics needs to be
treated as a stochastic individual-level model[176].
Coevolutionary dynamics is also an important arena
for game theory dynamics to play out in evolution and
ecology, because the level of cooperation between organ-
isms can be analyzed on an encounter-by-encounter basis
as the repetition of a cooperative game, such as the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma[177–181]. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the
two players have two states: they can either “cooperate”
or “defect”. If they cooperate, they receive a reward R, if
they both defect, they receive a punishment P , and if one
defects while the other cooperates, the former receives a
temptation T while the latter receives the sucker’s re-
ward S. If T > R > P > S, then the following dilemma
arises: a rational player would defect, because it yields
the highest reward independent of the state of the other
player. So in a contest with two rational players, each
will end up with the punishment P , which is a shame:
because if they had both cooperated, they would have
received the reward R. This game illustrates the para-
doxical nature of two-body interactions in cooperative
dynamical systems, but can sometimes provide an accu-
rate idealization of actual biological interactions, if the
biology can be meaningfully mapped into simple game
theory interactions terms.
In a remarkable experiment, Turner and Chao[182]
studied the evolution of fitness (measured in terms of
population growth) of phages that can multiply infect
the same bacterial cell. Viruses can cooperate by shar-
ing intracellular enzymes needed for reproduction and
can defect by sequestering the enzymes. Turner and
Chao engineered two strains to behave as cooperators
and defectors, and found that the strain with high rate
of co-infection initially increased in fitness over time, but
eventually evolved lower fitness, a counter-example to the
usual cavalier assumption that “fitness always increases”.
In this case, Turner and Chao were able to show that
this decline in fitness arose from collective effects: the
fitness of the virus strains conformed to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, whose pay-off matrix they were able to mea-
sure. Game theory is not the only way to interpret this
finding[183], but the key point is that collective effects
provide important and sometimes counter-intuitive in-
fluences in ecological and evolutionary interactions. The
huge literature on this area is beyond the scope of this
review, but other ecological interactions are measurable
and interpretable in game theory terms[184, 185].
We have emphasized in this review that the essence
of evolution is self-reference, but it is apparent that this
is not captured by the game theory models described
above. The problem is that the pay-off matrix is given
a priori, and is not able to evolve along with the sys-
tem itself. Thus, the effect of each agents’ actions on
changing the behavior of other players and the dynam-
ics of the environment is neglected. A bona fide game
theory approach to evolution would allow the game rules
themselves to change as a function of the state of the
players and their intrinsic dynamics. This is important
for the following reason: in the usual formulation of game
theory[178], there is an equilibrium state that can arise
known as an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Loosely
speaking, this can arise when a population of individuals
play in a cooperative game in which the payoff represents
the fitness, and selection is assumed to be operating. An
ESS is a strategy that if used by a large enough number
of individuals in a population is resistant to invasion by
alternative strategies, and as such represents some sort
of equilibrium (in fact a Nash equilibrium[186]). This
equilibrium state is in some sense analogous to thermal
equilibrium and reflects the static nature of the game it-
self. If the game was allowed instead to be dynamic, with
the rules of the game able to change due to the states of
the players, then in addition to static equilibria there
could also be dynamic equilibria, analogous to a non-
equilibrium steady state. Such a game could describe
a steadily evolving system, one with a stationary com-
plexity cascade (itself is analogous to a turbulent non-
equilibrium state).
Akiyama and Kaneko[187, 188] seem to be the only
researchers who have explicitly argued along these lines,
making a first step towards a theory for truly-evolving
games using dynamical systems theory to analyze a co-
operative game with an evolving pay-off matrix. Other
game theoretic models that include some sort of dynami-
cal or learning behavior, such as players using their scores
to adjust the frequency of a finite set of a priori given re-
sponses, have been developed, describing the system tra-
jectories, showing that chaotic dynamics can arise, and
shedding doubt about the applicability of Nash equilib-
ria in the real world of dynamical games[189]—and by
extension to evolution.
A related development has been the dynamics of
spatially-extended game theoretic models that study the
evolution of cooperation, in which there is coevolution of
the network of connections between players[190, 191] and
the players’ strategies as the game progresses. Typically
players update their strategy based upon their interac-
tions with their network neighbours during the game,
representing perhaps the simplest game theory models
where there is feedback between the environment and
the agents[192]. Finally, there has been progress in the
most difficult aspect of the relationship between game
theory and evolutionary biology: understanding how ef-
fective game theoretic description can arise from the
macroscopic dynamics of agents interacting with their
environment[193]. We conclude this section by recalling
that evolutionary dynamics is more general than biology
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itself, and thus it should come as no surprise that there
are applications of evolutionary game theory to evolu-
tionary finance[194, 195], and indeed meaningful analo-
gies between ecosystem dynamics and finance[196].
IS EVOLUTION RANDOM?
We would be remiss in ending this article if we did
not briefly mention the fascinating question: is evolu-
tion random? More precisely, does variation precede
but not cause adaptation—the central tenet of the mod-
ern synthesis—or do environmental changes alter the
stochastic nature of the evolutionary process? Any in-
dication that organisms can chose which mutations arise
after an environmental stress has been applied would be
anathema to the central tenet of the modern synthesis,
and would require a re-evaluation of how evolution is
widely understood.
In a classic experiment involving the exposure of
a strain of E. coli to bacteriophages, Luria and
Delbru¨ck[197] showed that the probability distribution
for the number of mutants exhibited the characteristics
expected only if random mutations had been present be-
fore exposure to the phage, and apparently ruling out
the hypothesis that mutations occurred as a result of
the phage. This might seem to put the matter to rest,
but because there is a priori no theoretical reason why
a cell could not sense environmental stress and respond
in a non-random way, researchers have persisted in ex-
ploring this issue experimentally. Although early exper-
iments are generally recognized as not being properly
analyzed[198], a plethora of mechanisms have now been
reported to give rise to an adaptive response to stress,
including regulation of mutation rates (non-random in
time) and localized variation along the genome (non-
random in genome space)[88, 91, 199].
There is also compelling evidence that not only may
mutations be non-random but horizontal gene transfer
too need not be random. Enterococcus faecalis, a gut-
dwelling bacterium, can be resistant to certain antibiotics
if it contains the plasmid (an extrachromosmal loop of
DNA) pCF10. This plasmid can be horizontally trans-
ferred from a donor with the plasmid to a recipient ini-
tially without it, through the process of conjugation (bac-
terial sex). The remarkable feature of this organism, how-
ever, is that the transfer is controlled by and initiated by
signals sent from the recipient[200]. The vancomycin re-
sistant strain V583 of this organism is now one of the
leading causes of hospital-acquired infection, spreading
rapidly through horizontal gene transfer[201].
CONCLUSION
In the natural development of the sciences, issues of
complexity are sensibly postponed until they can no
longer be avoided. Physics was able to delay serious con-
sideration of collective effects for nearly three hundred
years, and only in the last thirty years or so has it con-
fronted complex collective phenomena involving multiple
scales of space and time, unpredictable dynamics and
large fluctuations. Its track record of success is mixed.
Biology was not so lucky: at its outset, complex phe-
nomena were encountered, but tools were lacking to cope
with the difficulty. Rather than abiding by ignorance,
a language-culture was developed to explain away the
conceptual difficulties using guesswork solutions such as
“natural selection”. As Schro¨dinger wrote,
“Instead of filling a gap by guesswork, genuine sci-
ence prefers to put up with it; and this, not so much
from conscientious scruples about telling lies, as from
the consideration that, however irksome the gap may
be, its obliteration by a fake removes the urge to seek
after a tenable answer.”—E. Schro¨dinger, Nature and
the Greeks, pp7-8.[202]
Today, with the “urge” removed, the development
of sophisticated technology has allowed biology to take
refuge in single-molecule biophysics, genomics and molec-
ular biology. But the stultifying language-culture still
remains. This sanctuary is an illusionary respite: the
core problems of biology remain irksome to some, and
are inextricably interwoven with evolution. Indeed, the
very existence of biological phenomena is an expression
of physical laws that represent a new asymptotic realm
in nonequilibrium statistical physics. Ulam famously
quipped[203] “Ask not what physics can do for biology;
ask what biology can do for physics.” Our answer is clear.
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